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Abstract
In an influential paper, Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013) exploit geographic variation
in housing supply elasticities to measure the effect of changes in the housing share
of net worth on total household expenditures during the Great Recession. Their
widely-cited estimates are based on proprietary house price data, and use new
vehicle registrations as the main proxy for total spending. We revisit their study
using different, publicly available data on house prices, and an easily-accessible
proxy for expenditures in non-durable goods. We re-affirm their findings in our
data, and refine their analysis in several dimensions: (i) we separate the roles
of falling house prices and initial leverage; (ii) we distinguish the effects on real
consumption versus nominal expenditures; and (iii) we infer the implied elasticity
of total non-durable expenditures in goods and services to housing net worth.
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Introduction

One of the most distinctive features of the Great Recession was that the drop in household consumption expenditures was sharper, broader and more persistent than in other
recent downturns. Unlike in past recessions, virtually all components of consumption
expenditures, not just durables, dropped substantially (Petev, Pistaferri, and Eksten,
2012). The leading explanation for these atypical aggregate consumption dynamics
is the simultaneous extraordinary destruction of housing net worth: most aggregate
house price indexes show a decline of around 30 percent over this period, and only a
partial recovery towards trend since.
To what extent is the plunge in housing wealth responsible for the decline in the
consumption expenditures of US households during the Great Recession? A reliable
answer to this question is helpful in shaping the way that economists think about key
issues such as consumption insurance, the sources of aggregate fluctuations, and the
role of policy in mitigating the costs of business cycles.
In a widely influential paper, Mian et al. (2013) — hereafter referred to as MRS
— exploit geographic variation in house price declines over the period 2006-2009 and
household balance sheets in 2006, to estimate the elasticity of consumption expenditures to changes in the housing share of household net worth. They obtain estimates
of this elasticity in the range of 0.6 to 0.8 for total spending (including both durables
and non-durables). These estimates come from both OLS regressions, and IV regressions that use the local housing supply elasticity index constructed by Saiz (2010) as
a source of exogenous variation in the exposure of different geographical areas to a
common aggregate housing shock.1
Given the enormous influence that the MRS estimates have had on academia and
policy, our first goal in this paper is to address two important limitations of their
analysis. First, essentially all of their data come from proprietary sources. This has
restricted the possibility for other researchers to replicate their findings and verify the
robustness of their estimates.2
1

There is disagreement in the literature about the validity of the Saiz (2010) housing supply
elasticities as an instrument for regional differences in house price changes in the context of these
regressions (Davidoff, 2013). We are agnostic about this debate since in this note our objective is
limited to a replication and robustness analysis of an influential piece of academic research. Readers
who are skeptical of the validity of the instrument can safely focus on the OLS estimates —none of
our measurements necessarily require a causal interpretation in order to be of economic interest.
2
There is a growing consensus among economists that transparency of empirical research should
be an important goal for the profession, particularly when it concerns high profile, influential and
surprising findings. See, for example Cochrane (2015) and Cochrane (2016), as well as Card, Chetty,
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Second, the empirical analysis in MRS uses a proxy for total expenditures based
on two sources: (i) R.L. Polk new vehicle registrations; and (ii) MasterCard data on
credit-card spending from a 5% random sample of the population. It is well known that
automobiles purchases are significantly more volatile than purchases of other goods and
services, and are fairly unique in their cyclicality. Moreover, since most macroeconomic
models are specified in terms of non-durable consumption, the most useful house-price
elasticity for parameterizing these models or comparing their implications with data is
the elasticity with respect to non-durable consumption alone.
Hence, our first contribution is to verify the robustness of the MRS findings using
different data on both expenditures and housing net worth. For non-durable expenditures, we use store-level sales from the Kilts-Nielsen Retail Scanner Dataset (KNRS),
a panel dataset of total sales (quantities and prices) at the UPC (barcode) level for
around 40,000 geographically dispersed stores in the US. KNRS data are now available
in all major universities and research centers. To construct our measure of local housing net worth, we use house price data from Zillow, which is freely available online,
whereas MRS use proprietary data from Core Logic.
In spite of these differences, our findings are very reassuring. When we replicate
MRS using our own data sources, we obtain an OLS estimate of 0.24 and an IV
estimate of 0.36 for the elasticity of non-durable expenditures to housing net worth
shocks. Based on Mastercard data on non-durables alone, MRS report OLS estimates
of 0.34-0.38. Using the KNRS expenditure data together with a measure of the change
in the housing share of net worth provided by MRS, we obtain an OLS estimate of 0.34
and an IV estimate of 0.37 – essentially the same elasticities that MRS find. Our lower
baseline estimate can therefore be attributed to our use of Zillow house price data,
which show a somewhat different cross-regional pattern of house price growth than the
Core Logic house price data. Overall, we find it encouraging that two very different
measures of household spending yield such similar elasticity estimates.
After reaffirming the MRS findings with different, easily accessible data on both
the main dependent and independent variables, we offer three additional contributions
to the academic and policy debate. First, we distinguish the overall elasticity of nondurable expenditures with respect to changes in house prices, from the elasticity with
respect to the housing net worth shock that arose from those price changes. This alternative regression specification is useful because (a) it can be more easily compared
with previous attempts to estimate the relationship between house prices and conFeldstein, and Saez (2010).
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sumption; (b) it allows us to test, rather than to impose, that the household balance
sheet channel was the most important transmission mechanism during this episode;
and (c) it is valuable as a summary statistic that can be used to discipline quantitative
structural investigations of the joint dynamics of consumption and housing during the
Great Recession.3 Our main finding is that the interaction between the fall in local
house prices and the size of initial leverage has no statistically significant effect on nondurable expenditures, once the direct effect of the fall in local house prices has been
controlled for.
Second, we separate the price and quantity components of the fall in nominal consumption expenditures. In the KNRS data, it is possible to observe the quantities of
goods sold at the UPC level, together with the corresponding average price for every
UPC for every store in every week. This unique feature of these data allows us to
distinguish the effect of changes in house prices on the relative price of non-durable
goods, from the effect on the quantities of goods purchased and consumed. The first
component, as noted by Stroebel and Vavra (2014), can be interpreted as the outcome
of demand shocks on local mark-ups. The second component measures the impact
of changes in household wealth on the real demand for non-durable goods, including
the substitution and income effects that result from the equilibrium change in prices.
When we control for these changes in prices, we find an elasticity that is 20% smaller
than our baseline estimates for nominal expenditures.
Third, since the KNRS bundle covers only a subset of nondurables and services, a
plausible concern is that it is not representative of the reaction of total non-durables
to house prices. We use the Diary Survey of the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE)
to estimate the elasticity of total nondurable goods and services to the CE counterpart
of expenditures in the KNRS bundle.4 We obtain an elasticity between 0.7 and 0.9,
suggesting that the elasticities we estimated for KNRS expenditures should be reduced
by roughly 20% when applied to total non-durable goods and services.
3

A number of recent papers study this topic: see, for example, Berger, Guerrieri, Lorenzoni, and
Vavra (2015), Corbae and Quintin (2015) Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2015), Gorea
and Midrigan (2015), Hedlund (2014), Huo and Rıos-Rull (2015), Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2013),
Landvoigt (2015), Kaplan, Mitman, and Violante (2015).
4
Attanasio, Battistin, and Ichimura (2005) argue that the Diary Survey is the component of the
CE where household non-durable expenditures are best measured
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Department
Dry grocery
Frozen foods
Dairy
Deli
Packaged meat
Fresh produce
Non-food grocery
Alcohol
Health and beauty aids
General merchandise
Number of stores

All Stores (2006)
37%
8%
8%
2%
3%
3%
13%
5%
14%
8%
31,093

Continuing Stores (2006-09)
37%
8%
8%
2%
3%
3%
13%
5%
14%
8%
29,681

Baseline OLS Sample
37%
8%
8%
2%
3%
2%
13%
5%
14%
9%
14,756

Table 1: Distribution of types of goods sold at stores in the KNRS sample
Notes: The baseline OLS sample restricts attention to continuing stores located in CBSAs for which
we have house price data available.

2

Data sources

2.1

Expenditure data

We use data on store-level sales from the Kilts-Nielsen Retail Scanner Dataset (KNRS)
as our measure of non-durable expenditures. The KNRS is a weekly panel dataset
of total sales at the UPC (barcode) level for around 40,000 geographically dispersed
stores in the United States. The survey records both quantities and prices. From this
weekly-UPC level data we construct an annual store-level panel of total sales. We also
aggregate sales across all stores in each Core-Based Statistical Area (CBSA) to obtain
a measure of CBSA-level expenditures.5
Table 1 shows the breakdown of goods sold at stores in the KNRS sample by
department code in 2006.6 The KNRS bundle is mostly composed of non-durables
and is overweighted in food, but also contains non-food grocery (e.g., detergents and
laundry supplies), health and beauty aids (e.g., cosmetics and drugs), and a residual
category called general merchandise that includes some small household durables (e.g.,
cookware, electronics, office supplies).7
The types of goods covered by the data is unchanged when we restrict attention
to stores present in both 2006 and 2009, and to stores located in CBSAs for which
5

See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Core-based_statistical_area for a definition of a
CBSA and its relationship to Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) and Combined Statistical Areas (CSA).
6
Department code is the first level in the product hierarchy, with UPC being the most detailed
level of disaggregation.
7
Nielsen also collects information on goods that do not have UPCs (known as Magnet data). These
goods are excluded from our analysis.
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Figure 1: Left panel: Total annual sales for continuing stores in KNRS data vs various
definitions of non-durable expenditures in NIPA, all normalized to 1 in 2006. Right
panel: 2006-09 state-level sales growth for continuing stores in KNRS vs non-durable
expenditures in NIPA
we have data on housing net worth (i.e. the sample used for our baseline estimates).
According to the KNRS data manual (Kilts Center for Marketing, 2014), in 2011 the
expenditures reflected in the raw data cover 53% of total sales in food, 55% of drugs,
32% of mass merchandise and 1% of liquor.
Retail sales in KNRS are a good proxy for non-durable spending in terms of aggregate time-series variation and geographic cross-sectional variation.8 The left panel
of Figure 1 shows a time-series plot of annual expenditures in the KNRS sample for
the subset of stores that are always present in the data, together with various categories of consumption expenditures from the National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA, Table 2.3.5). Between 2006 and 2009, nominal growth in KNRS sales lies between growth in Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) in non-durables goods
and growth in PCE in non-durables goods and services (excluding gasoline and other
energy goods, whose price plummeted in the recession). Growth during 2010-11 is also
aligned well with these measures. The only significant discrepancy occurs in 2009-10,
when KNRS expenditures are flat whereas NIPA expenditures rise.
The right panel of Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of the state-level 2006-09 change
in expenditures in the KNRS data versus the NIPA data (state-level is the finest
level of geographic aggregation for expenditure data that is published by NIPA). The
correlation of these growth rates is 0.54.
Since we conduct our analysis using store-level changes in sales, we effectively con8

In Section 5, we also show that the KNRS bundle accounts for roughly 40 percent of expenditures
in non-durable goods and services.

5

trol for changes in the composition of stores in a given region across years. None of
our findings are affected by restricting attention to stores that are present for all intermediate years. There is still the concern that variation in entry and exit of stores
—especially exit, over this recessionary period — differentially affects sales growth of
continuing stores across areas and generates an attenuation bias in our estimates. For
example, areas with the largest drop in house prices may be those with the sharpest
rise in store exit which, in turn, weakens the drop in sales in continuing stores as households shift their shopping towards surviving stores. To verify whether this is a serious
concern, we have also repeated our analysis by aggregating store sales at the broader
CBSA-level. None of our main results are affected.

2.2

Housing and financial net worth data

The second important variable in our analysis is household net worth, which we construct for the years 2006-2010. We define household net worth in region i at date t
as
N Wti = Hti + Fti − Mti − Dti
where Hti is housing wealth, Fti is financial assets, Mti is mortgage debt, and Dti is
non-mortgage household debt.
We now describe the construction of these variables one by one. Each region i is a
county, which we later aggregate into CBSAs.
Financial assets: We follow the corresponding calculation in MRS step by step.
From the quarterly IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) data, we obtain the fraction of
non-wage income (Adjusted Gross Income - wages and salaries) coming from interest
and dividends for each county. Next we allocate total financial assets from the Flow of
Funds (FoF) Balance Sheet of Households to each county/quarter based on the fraction
of interest and dividends in each county/quarter. The implicit assumption is that the
representative household in each county/quarter holds the market index for stocks and
bonds.
Housing wealth: We compute the total number of houses by county from the
American Community Survey (ACS) and generate housing wealth by multiplying them
by the Zillow Home Value Index for All Homes. We verify that total housing wealth
lines up well with its FoF counterpart for this period.
The Zillow data are publicly available from http://www.zillow.com/research/data.
In constructing housing wealth, MRS use the Core Logic house price price index, which
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1

Figure 2: Left panel: Core Logic vs Zillow house price growth, aggregate time series.
Right panel: Core Logic vs Zillow house price growth across states, June 2013. Source:
Fleming and Humphries (2013)
is based on proprietary data. This is the most important discrepancy between our data
sources and those in MRS for the construction of household net worth. The main difference between Core Logic and Zillow is that the former is a repeat-sale index, whereas
the latter is a hedonic price index that also includes sales of new homes. There are
pros and cons to both approaches, as discussed in Fleming and Humphries (2013). The
left panel of Figure 2 shows a strong time-series correlation between the two aggregate
house price indexes, although the Core Logic data show both a larger boom and larger
bust than the Zillow data. The right panel of Figure 2 shows annual house price growth
for selected US states according to the two price series for the year ending 2013. For
some areas, there are sizable differences in price growth between the two series.
Liabilities: Our main source of data on household debt by county is the quarterly
FRB-NY Consumer Credit Panel (CCP). The underlying source of these latter data is
Equifax, which is the data source used by MRS, so this portion of the data construction
is also very comparable. The CCP has information on levels of mortgage debt and nonmortgage debt (auto loans and revolving consumer credit) in each county. Since the
CCP does not have data on student loans, we do an imputation for each county based
on the aggregate fraction of total household debt represented by student loans from
the FoF. We then define other debt (Dti ) as the sum of auto and student loans and
revolving consumer credit. Finally, we rescale debt in each county proportionately, so
that the total in the CCP in each quarter equals the FoF total household liabilities.
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3

Expenditure elasticities to housing net worth shocks

We follow closely the regression specification in MRS. In particular, we define the
housing share of net worth as the ratio between housing wealth and household net
worth, Hti /N Wti , and the log-change in this variable between date t and t + τ induced by changes in house prices – referred to as the ‘housing net worth shock’ – as
i
= ∆ log pit,t+τ × (Hti /N Wti ) .
∆HN Wt,t+τ
In our baseline model, we regress the three-year changes in store-level annual sales
from 2006 to 2009 on the CBSA-level housing net worth shock over the same timeperiod. We focus on 2006-09 since this corresponds roughly to the period of the sharpest
house price declines (Figure 2), and is the three-year period studied in MRS. However,
since Figure 2 also shows that house prices were still rising in early 2006 and still falling
in 2010, we also present results for other periods that exclude 2006 and include 2011.
Our OLS regression specification is
s,i
∆ log C06−09

= β0 +

β1 ∆ log pi06−09



i
H06
i
N W06



+ s,i
06−09 .

(1)

where the dependent variable is sales of KNRS goods in store s in CBSA i. The independent variable is the CBSA-level change in the housing share of net worth induced
by changes in local house prices.9 We weight observations by store-level sales in 2006
(alternative weighting possibilities have little impact on the results), and we cluster by
CBSA when computing standard errors.
In the left panel of Figure 3 we show a scatter plot of the change in CBSA-level
P
i
where C i = s∈i C s,i , against the CBSA-level change in the
sales, i.e. ∆ log C06−09
housing share of net worth, together with linear and non-linear fitted lines. The size
of the circles reflects the weight of each CBSA in the regression. There is a clear
positive slope that is strongest in areas which experienced the smallest declines in the
housing share of net worth. Among areas with large declines (below −10 pct), there is
essentially no relationship between spending and the log-change in the housing share
of net worth.
Our IV regressions follow closely the specification in MRS. We use the estimates of
housing supply elasticities from Saiz (2010) to instrument for the housing net worth
shock. This instrument is provided at the CBSA level, and is not available for all of the
CBSA’s in which we observe store-level changes in expenditure because not all CBSAs
9

In Section 4 we consider reasonable alternative ways of constructing the independent variable in
this regression.
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Figure 3: Left panel: Mean log change in store level sales from 2006-2009 versus log
change in housing net worth. Right panel: Log change in housing net worth from
2006-2009 versus housing supply elasticity. Linear and non-linear fit lines. Size reflects
CBSA-level sales in 2006.
are covered by the Saiz (2010) data. As a result, the OLS and IV samples differ.10
The right panel of Figure 3 shows a scatter plot of the first stage of this regression,
i.e. the change in the CBSA-level housing share of net worth against the Saiz (2010)
instrument, together with linear and non-linear fitted lines. The figure is suggestive of
a strong first stage, but also reveals a marked degree of non-linearity in the strength of
the relationship. In particular, the relationship between changes in the housing share of
net worth and the instrument is much stronger among low elasticity areas than among
high elasticity areas. Given the poor fit of the linear specification, particularly for high
elasticity areas where the reduced form relationship is strongest (Figure 3, right panel),
we use a quartic polynomial in the Saiz housing supply elasticity as our instrument.
The use of a non-linear first stage represents another difference with MRS, who use
a linear first stage, and sharpens the estimates without having a large impact on the
value of the coefficients.11
Table 2 reports our main results. For the three-year period 2006 to 2009, we obtain a
baseline elasticity estimate of 0.24 (0.03) using OLS, and of 0.36 (0.08) using IV (Table
2, first two columns). Both estimates are significant at the 1% level. The corresponding
IV estimate with a linear first stage is 0.41 (0.09) (Table 2, third column).
In their Table III, MRS report an estimated elasticity of 0.63 (0.12) using OLS,
10

This difference in samples has a negligible impact on the estimates.
For all specifications, instrumenting with a quartic polynomial of the elasticity results in uniformly
marginally lower IV estimates and smaller standard errors than the corresponding estimates that
restrict to a linear first stage.
11
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OLS

2006-09
CBSA
IV
IV (linear)

2006-09
County
OLS
IV

2006-09
CBSA - MRS HNW
OLS
IV

∆HN W i

0.239**
(0.029)

0.361**
(0.077)

0.405**
(0.089)

0.207**
(0.025)

0.192*
(0.080)

0.341**
(0.047)

0.286**
(0.116)

N
Clusters
R2

14,756
281
0.024

12,701
181
0.017

12,701
181
0.012

21,226
584
0.017

16,748
382
0.017

22,945
330
0.019

19,513
233
0.018

Table 2: Elasticity of non-durable expenditures to housing net worth
and of 0.77 (0.24) using IV for their measure of durable spending (vehicle registration).
These are larger numbers compared to ours, which is intuitive as durables are much
more cyclical. In Table 2 of their Online Appendix not for publication, the authors
report elasticity estimates using data on non-durable and services expenditure from
MasterCard, a proprietary dataset of purchases using either debit or credit cards that
are part of the MasterCard network. This proxy for expenditures is closer to ours and
to a representative bundle of non-durable goods.
Their OLS estimates for non-durables vary from 0.34 (0.11) to 0.38 (0.10), depending on the exact definition, and are therefore remarkably similar to ours.12 One possible
concern may be that MRS use county-level data rather than CBSA-level data in these
regressions. When we re-estimate (1) using the county-level equivalent of our measure
of the housing net worth shock, we obtain an OLS estimate of 0.21 (0.03) and an IV
estimate of 0.19 (0.08) (Table 2, fourth and fifth columns). Hence the difference in
the level of geographic aggregation has only a minor effect on the OLS estimates. The
impact on IV estimates is somewhat larger, but the discrepancy between county- and
CBSA-level estimates is not statistically significant.
Although MRS are not able to make their county-level measures of the housing
share of net worth available for other researchers due to the proprietary nature of
their sources, they do make an analogous CBSA-level measure available that replaces
Equifax data for debt with the FRB-NY CCP data (the same source that we use),
and replaces Core Logic data on house prices with the house price index produced
by the FHFA. When we use this one as our independent variable, we obtain an OLS
elasticity estimate of 0.34 (0.05) and IV of 0.29 (0.12) (Table 2, sixth column). It is very
reassuring that two completely different sources of data on non-durable expenditures
generate essentially identical estimates for the elasticity with respect to changes in the
12

MRS do not report the IV counterpart of these estimates for non-durable expenditures.
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2006-10
OLS
IV

2006-11
OLS
IV

2007-09
OLS
IV

2007-10
OLS
IV

2007-11
OLS
IV

∆HN W i

0.263**
(0.024)

0.455**
(0.099)

0.274**
(0.023)

0.462**
(0.090)

0.208**
(0.027)

0.328**
(0.088)

0.244**
(0.031)

0.458**
(0.131)

0.260**
(0.027)

0.509**
(0.133)

N
Clusters
R2

14,536
281
0.028

12,518
181
0.015

14,220
281
0.032

12,231
181
0.021

16,266
338
0.015

13,735
183
0.009

16,032
338
0.02

13,544
183
0.006

15,682
338
0.021

13,226
183
0.005

Table 3: Elasticity of non-durable expenditures to housing net worth in alternative
time periods
housing share of net worth, provided that the latter variable is consistently measured.
Our estimates of the elasticity of non-durable spending to changes in the housing
share of net worth are relatively insensitive to the particular choice of time period.
In Table 3 we report corresponding estimates for alternative time periods around the
Great Recession. Since the decline in expenditures typically lagged the fall in house
prices, including 2010 and/or 2011 leads to larger estimates (since house prices had
mostly leveled off by 2010 but consumption was still declining), and excluding 2006
leads to smaller estimates (since house prices were falling through most of 2006 but
the largest declines in consumption were still to come).

4

Expenditure elasticities to house prices

As in MRS, the independent variable in our baseline regression specification (1) is
the change in
housing share of net worth induced by the change in house prices,
 the
i
H
∆ log pi06−09 N W06i . MRS focus on this specification because they are interested in
06
investigating the strength of a particular transmission mechanism for the effects of
changes in house prices on expenditures, the so-called household balance sheet channel.
According to this narrative, one would expect two regions experiencing the same size
decline in house prices to differ in their expenditure responses depending on how big
of an impact the change in house prices has on their net worth.
An alternative interpretation of this same variable is that of an interaction between
local house price changes ∆ log pi06−09 and the initial share of housing in net worth
i
H06
, which is a measure of leverage. We can therefore test for the presence of the
NW i
06
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∆ log pi

∆ log pi



Hi
NW i

2006-09
OLS
OLS

OLS

IV

0.169**
(0.020)

0.260**
(0.057)



0.136*
(0.057)

0.176**
(0.067)

0.050
(0.097)

-0.014
(0.116)

Hi
NW i

∆ log pi

OLS

OLS

0.119**
(0.031)

0.116**
(0.029)

0.036
(0.019)

0.037*
(0.017)

-0.034
(0.027)


Hi
H i −M i



Hi
H i −M i

N
Clusters
R2

-0.003
(0.003)
14,756
281
0.026

12,701
181
0.019

14,756
281
0.026

14,756
281
0.026

14,756
281
0.026

14,756
281
0.026

Table 4: Elasticity of non-durable expenditures to house prices: alternative specifications to assess the household balance-sheet channel
housing wealth channel with the following more general specification of the regression:
s,i
∆ log C06−09

= β0 +

β1 ∆ log pi06−09



i
H06
i
N W06


+

β2 ∆ log pi06−09


+ β3

i
H06
i
N W06



+ s,i
06−09 .

(2)
The coefficient on the interaction term β1 measures the extent to which the elasticity
with respect to prices depends on the initial housing share of net worth, and so is a test
for the presence of a strong household balance sheet channel, over and above the effect
of the fall in house prices. The restriction implicit in the MRS specification, i.e. that
β2 = β3 = 0 (meaning that changes in house prices only impact expenditures through
their effect on the housing share of net worth), can then be explicitly evaluated.
In Table 4 we report estimates of alternative specifications based on equation (2).
The estimate of the elasticity of non-durable expenditures with respect to house prices,
β̂2 , is 0.17 (0.02) using OLS, and 0.26 (0.06) using IV. Since the housing share of
net worth at the CBSA-level is typically far below unity, the elasticities with respect
to house prices in the first two columns of Table 4 are necessarily smaller than the
elasticities with respect to the house price induced changes in the housing share of net
worth in the first two columns of Table 2. When we include the interaction term as
12

∆ log H i

∆ log H i − M i

N
Clusters
R2

2006-09
OLS

OLS

IV

0.124**
(0.019)

0.183**
(0.038)



14,756
281
0.021

12,701
181
0.017

IV

0.072**
(0.011)

0.121**
(0.025)

13,724
229
0.021

11,745
171
0.012

Table 5: Elasticity of non-durable expenditures to gross and net housing wealth
an additional regressor, either with or without the initial level of the housing share of
net worth, the OLS estimate of β2 is barely affected while the OLS estimate of β1 is
small and negative, and is statistically indistinguishable from zero (columns 3 and 4).
i
When we instead use a measure of housing leverage ( H iH−M i ), the interaction term has
the correct sign and is barely statistically significant (columns 5 and 6).13 In sum, we
interpret the results in Table 4 as suggestive of the notion that at least some of the
observed co-movement between house prices and non-durable expenditures is due to
mechanisms other than the household balance sheet channel.
For completeness, we also report elasticities with respect to gross and net housing
wealth directly, rather than to house prices or the housing share of net worth. Future
quantitative studies of consumption and housing in the Great Recession may be interested in these elasticities. Which independent variable is most relevant will differ
depending on the specifics of the mechanism being investigated.
We report these alternative elasticity measures in Table 5. The estimated elasticities
with respect to gross housing wealth H i are 0.12 (OLS) and 0.18 (IV) (first and second
columns). These estimates are lower than the corresponding elasticities with respect to
house prices because, during this period, the regions with the largest decline in house
prices also had the largest fall in the quantity of housing (through lower investment).

5

Consumption versus expenditures

Our results have so far focused on nominal consumption expenditure. This measure is
of first order importance for understanding the transmission of house price shocks to
13
We report only OLS estimates for the specifications that include both changes in house prices and
the interaction between changes in house prices and initial net worth, since estimation by IV would
require additional instruments.
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∆HN W i

2006-09
OLS

OLS

IV

0.196**
(0.026)

0.290**
(0.085)

∆ log pi

N
Clusters
R2

14,756
281
0.016

12,701
181
0.012

IV

0.140**
(0.018)

0.213**
(0.061)

14,756
281
0.018

12,701
181
0.013

2007-11
OLS

OLS

IV

0.218**
(0.027)

0.444**
(0.135)

15,682
338
0.013

13,226
183
0.001

IV

0.128**
(0.015)

0.261**
(0.077)

15,682
338
0.013

13,226
183
0.002

Table 6: Elasticity of real non-durable consumption to housing net worth shocks
fluctuations in aggregate economic activity. However, it provides an imperfect measure
of the change in the real consumption of goods by households (e.g., Aguiar and Hurst
(2005) document that changes in food expenditures are not equivalent to changes in
food consumption). Since it is real consumption that matters for household welfare,
understanding the effect of changes in housing wealth on the quantity of nondurable
goods consumed is also of interest.
We construct a series for store-level real sales by aggregating product-level sales
(at the bar-code level) using product-level prices common across stores at a fixed date.
Our baseline measure uses the 2012 economy-wide average price for each product (or
the last year for which we have price data for discontinued products) – and is thus
close to a Paasche index – but we have tried various alternative choices and our results
are barely affected.14
When using consumption as the dependent variable, the elasticity estimates are
uniformly around 20% lower than the corresponding estimates in which expenditure
is the dependent variable (Table 6). For the 2006-09 period the OLS estimate of the
elasticity with respect to the housing net worth shock falls from 0.24 to 0.20, and the
IV estimate falls from 0.36 to 0.29. For the elasticity with respect to house prices,
the OLS estimate falls from 0.17 to 0.14, and the IV estimate falls from 0.26 to 0.21.
For the 2007-11 period the estimates of the elasticity of consumption with respect to
the housing net worth shock are 0.22 (OLS) and 0.44 (IV), and with respect to house
prices are 0.13 (OLS) and 0.26 (IV).
These findings suggest that a significant portion of the drop in consumption expenditures is due to equilibrium prices falling in response to the negative demand shock.
14

Our results are not affected by using a weighted (across stores) average price for each product, or
by restricting attention to products that are present in every year of the Nielsen data.

14

This conclusion is in line with the results in Stroebel and Vavra (2014) who argue that
a decline in mark-ups is responsible for these price dynamics.

6

From Kilts-Nielsen to total non-durables

A possible concern throughout our empirical analysis is that our measure of household
consumption expenditure obtained from the KNRS data may be rather narrow. One
may worry that these categories could display different dynamics form total nondurable
expenditures. In this section, we use the Consumption Expenditure survey (CE) to
estimate the elasticity of total nondurables to a subset of expenditures that is as close
as possible to the KNRS bundle. This number can be then used to rescale the various
expenditure elasticities to changes in housing net worth estimated in the previous
sections. Our aim is to estimate
D
log cN
= Dt + β00 Xit + β1 log cKN
+ εit ,
it
it

(3)

D
are expenditures
and cKN
where Dt are time dummies, Xit are a set of controls, and cN
it
it
on non-durables and the KNRS bundle, respectively. The elasticity of interest is β1 .
Our starting point is the sample constructed from the Diary Survey (DS) of the
CE by Attanasio et al. (2005).15 The DS is a cross-section of consumer units asked
to self-report their daily purchases for two consecutive one-week periods by means of
product-oriented diaries. Each diary is organized by day of purchase and by broad
classifications of goods and services. Compared to the more commonly used Interview
Survey (IS), where households are retrospectively asked for their usual expenditure in
the last quarter, the key advantage of the DS component of the CE is that expenditures on the goods we are interested in –specifically, the KNRS bundle which is the
independent variable of regression – are much more accurately measured.16 This is
an important consideration for us, since the attenuation bias from measurement error
tends to artificially reduce the estimate of the elasticity of total nondurables to KNRS
expenditures, the coefficient β1 in (3).
The sample in Attanasio et al. (2005) covers a large set of items belonging to
nondurable goods and services for survey years 1987-2001, i.e. the period preceding
15

We refer the reader to their paper for a description of the data. For an ever more detailed
presentation, see Battistin (2003). We thank Erich Battistin for sharing the data.
16
The insight of the Attanasio et al. (2005) paper is precisely that of using the DS measures for
frequently purchased goods and the IS measures for more durable goods and services in order to more
accurately measure changes in consumption inequality over time.
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Dependent variable:

Dgoods
log cN
it

Dgoods&serv
log cN
it

log cKN
it

0.905
(0.003)

0.679
(0.004)

Other controls
N
R2

Y
37,893
0.81

Y
37,893
0.54

Table 7: Elasticity of total non-durable expenditures to expenditures in the the KNRS
bundle. Source CEX.
the boom-bust. Based on their detailed classification, we define KNRS consumption
as the sum of food and non alcoholic beverages at home, alcohol, personal care, and
housekeeping products. This definition is close to the aggregate of the items included in
the KNRS data described in Section 2. For total non-durables we use two definitions.
ND goods include, in addition to the KNRS goods, clothing and footware, tobacco,
books, newspapers and magazines. This set of goods is close to the NIPA definition
of nondurable goods, excluding energy (NIPA Table 2.4.5). The second variable we
construct, ND goods and services, also includes food away from home, clothing services,
entertainment, communication services, and transportation.17
In our DS sample, median monthly KNRS expenditures are $840 and median spending in ND goods (ND goods and services) are $1,160 ($2,150). Thus, the fraction of
our strict (broad) definition of nondurables accounted for by the KNRS bundle is 72
(39) percent. For comparison, the same calculation from the NIPA Table 2.4.5 for 2000
yields 70 (39) percent.
In the regression (3) we control for year dummies (which capture changes in the
relative price of the KN bundle to total nondurables) as well as an equivalence scale, a
polynomial in age, and indicator variables for family type, race, education and region.
The results of these regressions are displayed in Table 7.
The estimates in Table 7 suggest that the elasticity of nondurable expenditures to
the KNRS bundle varies between 0.68 and 0.90, depending on how broad the definition
of non-durable expenditures is. Thus the estimates in the preceding sections should be
reduced by around 10 to 30 percent when interpreting them in terms of the effects on
total non-durable expenditures of consumption.
17

With respect to the NIPA definition of total services, we therefore exclude expenditures on housing,
health care, education, financial and insurance services. As pointed out by Attanasio et al. (2005)
and Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), these services have a more durable nature that closely
assimilates them to investment and saving activities.
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7

Conclusions

Transparency in empirical work, and the ability to replicate and verify the robustness
of widely influential results should be a pillar of applied economic research.
In this note we have shown that, by combining public and easily accessible data, it
is possible, for the first time, to reassess the findings of Mian et al. (2013) — findings
that have been instrumental in guiding the academic and policy debate on the role of
the collapse of housing in the Great Recession.
Our analysis largely confirms their results, therefore ruling out the possibility that
the large co-movement of consumption and house prices in the Great Recession is due
to peculiarities of their data sources.
We offer three additional contributions to this debate: (i) after controlling for the
drop in house prices, we do not find a significant independent effect of initial leverage
on non-durable expenditures, a result that casts some doubts on the balance-sheet
channel interpretation of the Great Recession; (ii) real consumption drops approximately 20 percent less than nominal expenditures on the KNRS bundle, implying a
sizable demand-induced fall in producer prices; (iii) when applied to total spending in
nondurable and services, the estimated elasticity of expenditures on the KNRS bundle
to changes in housing net worth should be reduced by roughly 20 percent.
Our preferred specifications (OLS estimates of the elasticity with respect to house
prices) suggest that the observed 30 percent decline in house prices during the Great
Recession can account for a 4.1% fall in nominal expenditures on nondurable goods
and services, and a 2.8% fall in consumption of nondurable goods and services over
the period 2006-09, and a 6.2% fall in nominal expenditures on nondurable goods and
services, and a 3.1% fall in consumption of nondurable goods and services over the
period 2007-11.
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